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Is It a Sin How Little of Our National Defense Budget We Spend on Bio Defense, Our Biggest Risk?

Is It a Sin How Little of Our National Defense Budget We Spend on Bio Defense, Our Biggest Risk?

By Dr. John Norris

Dr. John Norris is a former FDA COO and Harvard faculty member. He is a highly successful entrepreneur and expert in risk management for the "spread" of bio attacks. And he has written over 120 articles and posts on this topic's different aspects and perspectives.

Our politicians and other leaders' poor understanding of US and allied nations' bio attack risks is reckless and unforgivable. Nevertheless, they must be helped. Politicians at two levels, US and international, are poorly informed and weakly motivated to "do the right thing." Dr. Norris and his teammates believe this lack of bio attack knowledge, understanding, and motivation is creating weak preparation of the US and its allies for a near-term minor bio attack, which is the scale of an attack that is most likely. Given the state of the world, where fits of anger and heightened fears are increasingly boiling over, we "expect" (not "predict;" there is insufficient historical evidence to make predictions) that such an attack will likely occur in the next three years. And it will likely be performed by a terrorist group, such as Hamas, or a small hostile nation, such as Iran, although it likely will, by its nature, not be traceable to the aggressor. It might even be a "false flag" attack by a nation that "leaves crumbs" because it wants us to retaliate against Hamas or Iran.


Regrettably, almost as destructive to our people and the people of the globe is a "viable threat" of a bio attack. This is so because of the enormous at-home anxiety and significant loss of at-work morale that such a threat imparts on workers, families, and investors/taxpayers. Such forces will destroy local and national loyalty and productivity.

We estimate there is at least a vast number of times more risk that a small bio weapon, delivered by stealth, suicide, or false flag, will be used to attack the US than a small nuclear weapon. And a slight chemical weapon is not even in the picture. For many reasons, which we will briefly get into below, in terms of "actual use," both small atomic weapons and small chemical weapons are all but obsolete. No serious person continues to believe in chemical weapons. And money, power, and habit are the key drivers of our continued obsession with nuclear weapons. Yet, just because they are highly traceable as to the aggressor, they are both significant "deterrents" and, at proper levels, must be kept around. In reality, however, they will never be used offensively or defensively. So, we have to pretend we will. But concurrently, we need to protect ourselves from the far bigger real risk of the use of bio weapons.


Post the COVID-19 Pandemic, which caught almost every leader worldwide "with their pants down," the third rail of "weapons of mass destruction," bio attack weapons, are, with a high degree of certainty, the "weapons of choice" by all significant aggressors going forward. We must count on it and be prepared for it far better than we are now. It is reckless for politicians and our other leaders not to make sure we are.


Introduction


In today's dynamic and interconnected world, threats to national security come in various forms. While historical or traditional defense mechanisms for decades have been essential in safeguarding our nation, emerging risks, such as bio warfare and pandemics, demand a shift in our approach. It is crucial to analyze the allocation of our national defense budget and question whether we are adequately investing in bio defense, our greatest vulnerability. This article explores the implications of underinvestment in bio defense and the urgent need to prioritize this crucial aspect of national security.


The Changing Nature of National Security Threats


Gone are the days when warfare was limited to conventional weapons and territorial disputes. Advances in science and technology have given rise to a new era of threats, where invisible enemies, such as pathogens (germs), can wreak havoc on a global scale. Bio weapons, such as those that use deadly viruses and bacteria, and especially genetically engineered forms, pose an unprecedented risk to national security for the US and our allies. The deliberate, highly concentrated release of an extremely contagious and lethal agent could have catastrophic consequences, causing widespread casualties, economic collapse, and social disruption. Even a tiny bio attack, the most likely form, can kill tens of thousands, if not more, and disrupt our entire society.


Our fight is that the biggest real risk we face, bio attack, especially a small bio attack, is getting one billion dollars and nuclear attack is getting almost 1,000 times more. It makes no sense, no matter how you deal or split the cards. The looming risk of a "Non-Deterrable" small bio attack is possibly right around the corner. We are almost totally unprepared locally, nationally, and internationally.


While nuclear threats have traditionally occupied the top spot in our national defense concerns, technological advancements and "deterrence strategies" have effectively addressed this risk. However, as we will explain in more detail below, the new and more substantial danger we now face lies in the form of "non-deterrable" bio attacks. Unlike nuclear attacks that can be deterred through mutually assured destruction (MAD), the slim possibility of reciprocal bio attacks, because precisely finding the source of a bio attack is challenging, if not impossible, to find, holds little to no such deterrent value. The inherent nature of biological agents, such as their ability to grow and spread rapidly and covertly, makes them potentially devastating and impossible to deter through traditional means. If you don't know almost for sure who the aggressor is (and that it is not a "bread crumb laid false flag attack"), it would be viewed by humankind as reckless to retaliate against any country or any group. We sometimes say we will. But we won't. As a country and as a world, we would hold such an ill-founded retaliation as highly immoral, unethical, and dangerous.


A Few of the Facts


So, what are a few of the most relevant facts?

  1. The world's nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of about 12,100 nuclear warheads as of March 2024. All it takes to destroy another nation is a handful of the most powerful.

  2. In 2024, America's newest nuclear warhead will cost just under $100M to produce, budget documents show. How many of those do we need?

  3. The US spends between $75 billion and $93 billion, yes, between $75 billion and $93 billion, per year on adding new nuclear weapons to its already heavily over-packed stockpile of nuclear weapons. Again, how many of the new ones do you need? 10? 50? 100? Unconflited experts will likely know.

  4. Though it lasted fewer than four years, World War II was the most expensive war in United States history. Adjusted for inflation to today's dollars, the war cost over $4 trillion, just in direct dollars spent. In 1945, the war's last year, defense spending comprised about 40% of the US gross domestic product (GDP). Yes, 40%. The Middle Class was "hammered."

  5. The United States accounts for nearly 40% of global military spending and devotes a larger share of its GDP to defense than most other countries, large or small.

  6. According to our calculation, China will spend an estimated $471 billion on defense in 2024, or around 36 percent, yes, 36 percent, of comparable U.S. defense spending of about $886 billion (possibly $1.3 trillion with budget overruns) in 2024.

  7. Yet the US budgeted only a little over $1 billion for bio defense in 2024. In other words, it budgeted less than 1/900th or less of its defense budget on its biggest risk. Yes, its biggest risk. Is this crazy? Or is it defective politics? Can reckless politics drive a budget this far off course? Can we continue on this path and be safe? And survive?


Risk Analysis


This week, talking heads and political, economic, and military experts are saying the US is as unsafe, from a nuclear war perspective, as it was during the Cuba Missle Crisis in 1962. During that crisis, President John F. Kennedy and First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the head of state of the Soviet Union, had a nuclear war standoff regarding the planting of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba, just miles from the Florida coast. This crisis put us on the brink of nuclear war. Are they right? No. But we are at great risk for another reason.


Unless Vladimir Putin becomes seriously ill with a terminal disease or is seconds from being thrown out of office, there is little to no chance that he will use nuclear weapons, large or small, against the US, Israel, Ukraine, or another US Allie. The nuclear threat is vastly overstated and nearly 100% deterred. But is that the end of the risk analysis and discussion? No. Any reasonable analysis would include Russia completing, or funding one of its terrorist group or nation-state proxies to complete, an "unsourceable" small bio attack on us or our friends. We believe the risk of this happening within the next three years is high.


Why would this be the weapon of choice to put the US back on its heels, or worse, on its knees? (1) It would shock our people. (2) It would break the Bio Gini out of the bottle where it has been held captive militarily for decades. (3) It would usher in the new US and global standard of bio weapons being the weapon of choice for terrorist groups and hostile nations.

But, say the critics of our theory: Russia or one of its allies could not get away with such a dastardly act. They would get caught technologically almost immediately, like in the case when using nuclear or chemical weapons. And if not detected technologically, as with most conspiracies, someone would both know and tell someone, who would tell someone, etc. Of course, both reasons declared as a basis for failure are false. Here are the reasons why:


1. Small Bio Attacks Are Simply Undetectable as to Source. Strategic, small bio attacks are virtually undetectable as to source--and they grow and grow without the need to conduct follow-up attacks that might help the victim-nation of the attack discover the source of both attacks. The strategic idea used here by the attacker is to make the attack (or the viable threat thereof) as devastating as possible without making its source detectable. Even small nuclear and chemical attacks are easily detectable as to source. They cannot and never will be used in this way. Of course, large nuclear attacks are so detectable, destructive, and "respondable" that their victim's deterrence response will not be just theoretical but actual and immediately globally destructive. So, neither small nor large nuclear weapons will ever be used except as a means of deterrence. Accordingly, from now on, the real mass destruction "weapon of choice" will always be a bio weapon--strategically distributed in the form of a small bio attack on targets calculated by the stealth aggressor to be the best targets. For national security and defense reasons, we cannot say more.


2. Our Spies in Russia and Ukraine Will Not Detect the Plan Before the Bio Attack Happens. While there is some risk to the attacker that our spies will detect the source before the bio attack occurs and possibly head it off, the risk of detection is low. This is because, at most, five people need to know of the plan: The five include (1) Vladimir Putin, (2) possibly as few as two scientists who are gene editors capable of making the pathogen more stealth (including making it so it (1) hybernates for months post-planting and blooms synchronously or at a strategic rate or season/time, (2) is asymptomatic for months but is still contagious during all or most of the asymptomatic period, thereby increasing both the spread and "the scare factor," since you do not know who you can trust "to be clean," and (3) is easy to handle during distribution, so it can be easily handled, carried, and well hidden by the distributors without infecting them), contagious, and or deadly, and (3) possibly as few as two stealth suicide or non-suicidal "distributors" of the pathogen to the right targets, such as hospitals, universities, and manufacturers and or homes of senior politicians, CEOs, and COOs or other prominent leaders, such as government agency heads, including the leaders of DoD, HHS, Justice, and HS. If needed, the number of people "in the know" could be reduced to as low as three. In other words, this is not a dance that requires hundreds of people to be scripted and choreographed to the nth degree. Again, for national security and defense reasons, we cannot say more.


3. Our Spies in Russia and Ukraine Will Not Detect the Scheme Even After the Bio Attack Happens. The reasons here are nearly identical to those laid out in the first two paragraphs. While there is some risk that our scientists will detect the source and or our spies will detect the source after the attack and possibly head off the "growth of the spread," it is low. This is because, again, at most, five people need to know of the plan: Again, the five include (1) Vladimir Putin, (2) possibly as few as two scientists who are gene editors capable of making the pathogen more stealth, contagious, or deadly, and (3) possibly as few as two stealth, suicide or non-suicidal, "distributors" of the pathogen to the right targets, such as hospitals, universities, and manufacturers and or homes of senior politicians, CEOs, COOs, or other prominent leaders. Again, if needed, the number of people "in the know" could be reduced to three. Because "spreading" rather than "hidden, dormant, and other factors" are critical at this point, it might be impossible to prevent a "full bloom" of the seed once planted. It's the "spread" that kills millions. Five people can keep a secret. Certainly, three can. For national security and defense reasons, we cannot say more. Again, for national security and defense reasons, we cannot say more.


4. For the US to Retaliate, We Must Be Absolutely Certain as to the Source. For international and domestic morals, ethics, and law reasons and US traditions and reasoning that is hard-baked into our culture, for the US to retaliate, we must be "absolutely certain as to source." To create as much deterrence as we might, even though it is tiny, we will say we will take "blind shots," but we won't. It's not the American way. Regrettably, our enemies know this, so the amount of deterrence against bio attacks we can create is negligible, if any. Accordingly, we must put almost all of our bio attack resources into creating ever better prevention, mitigation, and control of "spread" strategies, programs, systems, tools, and other risk-management mechanisms (methods, ways, and means) rather than creating ever better bio weapons which we likely will never use and which will have almost no deterrence value even if we blindly thought they would. Our enemies won't believe it for a second. They realize that we will almost never be "certain as to source," and therefore will never retaliate in any way. A key insight to keep in mind is that a small, stealthy, undetectable attack using a deadly pathogen that kills people of every age, including children, is going to grow and grow. And if it is real or just a viable threat, when people learn that the "seeds have been planted," that knowledge will "spread like wildfire." Therefore, it is going to "scare half to death" everyone in the US and within our allies. Fear is an incredibly disruptive and destructive force. It is particularly destructive in the case where a worker is scared most about the possible death of their spouse and or children. Their attendance at work and productivity, both at work and at home if they do go into work, will drop like an anchor. Again, for national security and defense reasons, we cannot say more.


The Consequences of Neglecting Bio Defense


The consequences of neglecting bio defense are far-reaching and unimaginable. A small-scale bio attack has the potential to unleash a deadly contagion, causing massive casualties and overwhelming our healthcare systems, along with many other forms of harm. And the viable threat thereof might be almost as destructive to American morale and national productivity--and the economy. The loss of lives (or fear thereof) would be devastating, and the economic impact would be equally catastrophic, leading to widespread disruption and loss of productivity. In sum, the psychological effects on the populace would be profound, eroding public trust and creating an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty that could devastate our country and our allies.


The consequences of neglecting bio defense are catastrophic. Everyone knows this. But no one is doing anything about it. If large numbers of workers, spouses, and children had been killed by the COVID-19 attack, everyone would now be on their toes. But they weren't. And most people, including our politicians and other leaders, are blind to the likelihood that, next time, they likely will be killed and significantly otherwise harmed in vast numbers.


The Need for More--and More Proactive--Measures


In light of the dire consequences of a bio attack, including the more likely small one, it is imperative that we immediately take proactive measures to bolster our bio defense capabilities. This begins with a strategic reassessment of the allocations within our defense budget and a significant increase in investment dedicated to bio defense. Funding for bio defense research and development should be increased, and resources should also be allocated towards acquiring state-of-the-art equipment and training programs. And establishing robust response mechanisms, such as preparedness, prevention, mitigation, and control responses using bio defense strategies, programs, systems, tools, and other risk-management mechanisms.


The need for more--and more proactive--bio defense measures is obvious. But our politicians and other leaders are too blinded by other forces to see it.


Ensuring Preparedness and Resilience


Investing in bio defense is not just about allocating resources but also about ensuring preparedness and resilience. Adequate training and education of healthcare professionals, first responders, and relevant government agencies are crucial in effectively responding to a bio attack. Additionally, building resilient healthcare infrastructure and innovative surveillance systems are essential in detecting and containing the spread of infectious diseases. It's the "spread" that kills millions. By prioritizing bio defense, we can minimize the impact of a potential outbreak and protect our population from many different adverse consequences.


We must take every reasonable measure as soon as possible to ensure our preparedness and resistance at every level of society: local, national, and international.


The Role of Leadership and Advocacy


The responsibility of prioritizing bio defense lies in the hands of our politicians and other leaders and policymakers. We need visionary leaders who recognize the immediate importance of bio defense and advocate for increased funding and strategic planning. By rallying support from both sides of the political spectrum, which, once properly informed, both Democrats and Republicans are likely to support strongly, we can ensure bipartisan cooperation in addressing this critical issue. Additionally, public awareness campaigns and grassroots advocacy efforts can significantly generate public support and urge our politicians--and other leaders and policymakers--to take immediate, thoughtful, and decisive action.


In solving every complex problem in our country, and the world, there is no substitute for strong leadership at every level of society, local, national, and international. Local leadership must be as deep as department heads in businesses and government agencies. And as high as heads of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and leaders of nations.


Misallocation of Resources


As referenced earlier, under "Facts," (1) The world's nuclear-armed states possess a combined total of about 12,100 nuclear warheads as of March 2024. (2) In 2024, America's newest nuclear warhead will cost just under $100M to produce, budget documents show. (3) The US spends between $75 billion and $93 billion, yes, between $75 billion and $93 billion, per year on adding new nuclear weapons to its already heavily over-packed stockpile of nuclear weapons. (3) The United States accounts for nearly 40% of global military spending and devotes a larger share of its GDP to defense than most other countries. (4) According to our calculation, China will spend an estimated $471 billion on defense in 2024, or around 36 percent, yes, 36 percent, of comparable U.S. defense spending of about $886 billion (possibly $1.3 trillion with budget overruns) in 2024. (5) Yet the US budgeted a little over $1 billion for bio defense in 2024. In other words, it budgeted roughly 1/900th or less of its defense budget on its biggest risk. Yes, its biggest risk. Is this crazy? Or is it defective, even reckless, politics? Can reckless politics be allowed to drive a budget this far off course?


What are our politicians and leaders at all layers of our society doing about correcting this horrendous error? Do we really need more nuclear weapons? High quantities of more advanced delivery systems? Is this nutty situation being carried forward just by Cold War momentum? The nuclear Cold War is stalemated. It's called "Mutual Mass Destruction" (MMD) or "Mutual Assured Distruction" (MAD). Even schoolchildren know these phrases. But there are real and increasing bio threats. A large stockpile of nuclear weapons is a good deterrent, but that is all. Meanwhile, we have the real threat of the use of a small bio attack to deal with far more properly.


Our battle is not now with how much we spend on national defense. Our battle is with how we allocate it. The allocation leaves us "naked in the cold," when it comes to our largest risk: bio attack, large or small, but most likely small, but well-targeted and situated strategically so it will spread and spread and maximize deaths and or psychological harm, even if it is just a single small attack or only a viable threat of one.


Our fight is that the biggest real risk we face, bio attack, especially small bio attack, is getting only one billion dollars, and the vastly lesser risk, nuclear attack, is getting almost 1,000 times more. It makes no sense, no matter how you deal or split the cards.


This insanity cannot be left to stand. Someone or "someones" must immediately join our battle for the sake of America, Israel, our other allies, and all the world. Our exposure at this time in our history and the history of the world is enormous and intolerable.If you want to help, please text Dr. Norris at 617-680-3127.


Conclusion


In an ever-changing world, our approach to national defense must evolve accordingly. The risks posed by bio warfare and pandemics necessitate a reevaluation of our defense budget and a reallocation of an appropriate percentage of our resources spent towards bio defense. Neglecting this crucial aspect of national security and defense is shortsighted and can have devastating consequences. By increasing investment in bio defense, ensuring preparedness and resilience, and advocating for proactive measures, we can mitigate the risk of and level of damage from a bio attack and protect our nation and our allies from this formidable threat. It is not only our duty but also a moral imperative to prioritize bio defense and safeguard our people's well-being. It's not just up to politicians to educate themselves. And they cannot rely only on experts and lobbyists. It's all of our job to help. From academics to other leaders to media to concerned citizens--we must all help.


A Public Service Announcement by Safely2Prosperity and Its Executive Chairman, Dr. John Norris


We are pleased to cover this well-hidden story as a public service for the sake of our readers and all the people of the US and the world. We aim to have informed, educated, and committed leaders in the US and worldwide at all levels of society. We hope they buy our solution because it is the best. But if not, they must purchase "a" solution. Three alternative solutions are almost as good as S2P's VirusVigilant.


Safely2Prosperity (S2P) provides a "comprehensive infectious-disease spread risk-management solution," VirusVigilant, for business executives, government-agency heads, and nation leaders to protect their employees, families, investors, and others. S2P's VirusVigilant "Infectious Disease Safety Program" (like a Fire Safety Program but much more sophisticated and complex) combines a SaaS platform with customized risk management tools for overseeing add-on packages of vaccinations, testing, therapeutics, isolation (if infected), quarantining (if exposed), and tracking technologies, among many others. These tools help these leaders meet their moral, ethical, and legal responsibilities while protecting and enhancing workforce, family, and investor/taxpayer safety and productivity. Thereby, VirusVigilant helps assure (it's not "insurance," but "assurance," for leaders, so "they can sleep at night," at 1,000 times less the cost than health insurance) (1) business continuity, (2) revenue, (3) profits, (4) investor and insurer financial protection, and (5) the overall effectiveness and survival of the enterprise. With a focus on proactive measures, S2P offers a cost-effective, low-cost (as low as pennies per employee per month), intuitive solution for risk-managing infectious disease spread. "It's the spread that kills millions."


Dr. John Norris is a former FDA COO and Harvard faculty member. He is also a highly successful entrepreneur recognized as an expert in preventing, mitigating, controlling, and otherwise risk-managing the "spread" of infectious diseases. He has often published on this or related topics, including as editor-in-chief of two academic publications, one at Harvard (which he founded some 50 years ago) and the other at Cornell. And gave many presentations on the need for change in health and healthcare systems, including 300 presentations worldwide. Also, he helped reform the "regulatory procedures" used by the Joint Commission (which "regulates" hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes) and the US FDA (which regulates drug and medical device developers). Finally, he is a highly successful businessperson and entrepreneur. He and his former teammates sold one of their last start-ups for almost $2B in today's dollars.


As the historically world-renowned diplomat Benjamin Franklin said as he signed the US Declaration of Independence from England (the first, most costly, and most dangerous step in forming the United States as a country, but a critical step): "Gentlemen [and Ladies], we must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately." Thoughtful and aggressive "preparedness" is the first and most essential step in protecting our people and those of our allies from the devastation of a bio attack by a terrorist group, such as Hamas, or a hostile nation, such as Iran. It costs as little as 60 cents per employee per month (1,000th the cost of health insurance) to be prepared.


If you want to learn more about VirusVigilant, please get in touch with Dr. John Norris by text at 617-680-3127 or by email at John.Norris@Safely2Prosperity.com (mailto: John.Norris@Safely2Prosperity.com). S2P's website is safely2prosperity.com (http://safely2prosperity.com/).




© 2024 Safely2Prosperity LLC and Dr. John Norris, Executive Chairman. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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